Consider a society where all agents initially play "fair" and one agent invents a "cheating" strategy such as doping in sports. Which factors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with local information. Three factors determine the imitation dynamics of the model: the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of types, and the information available to the agents. In particular we …nd that the economy is more likely to end up in a state where all agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the agents are maximally segregated.
Introduction
In this paper we consider an evolutionary game where agents can either play fair or cheat. We want to identify the determinants that eventually lead to an absorbing state of the imitation dynamics in which all agents use the cheating strategy when initially all agents but one play fair. We are interested to identify the role of heterogeneity and the role of information for this process.
One application we have in mind is doping in sports.
1 There are two important factors that determine the spread of performance enhancing drugs.
First, for athletes it is di¢ cult to obtain information since their use is illegal.
Consequently, information about a new drug spreads through word-of-mouth communication, respectively it is only shared among athletes who trust each other. 2 Second, athletes have di¤erent talents and so in equilibrium doping a¤ects their winning probabilities di¤erently.
We capture these aspects by considering an evolutionary game with local information and asymmetric contests. In this game in each period a …nite number of in…nitely lived agents are matched pairwise to play a 2 2 stage game. In each stage game, the agents compete for a prize of value w by either playing "fair"or "cheat." Agents are of two types: high or low. High types have a natural advantage over low types: they obtain the prize w with certainty if they meet a low type and if both use the same strategy. If, however, a low type cheats against a fair playing high type, he beats the high type with certainty and receives the prize w. If two players of the same type meet and if both use the same strategy, they share the prize of value w.
Cheating is costly where the cost c satis…es 0 < c < w.
There are two stage games. First, if two agents of the same type meet, the stage game is a Prisoner's Dilemma where cheating (playing fair) is the dominant strategy if the cost of cheating is su¢ ciently low (high). Second, if two agents of opposite type meet, the stage game is asymmetric. In this game, the low type's best response is the strategy that is not used by the high type, and the high type's best response is the strategy that the low type is using.
In each period each agent is matched sequentially to all other agents, i.e., agents interact globally. At the end of the period, each agent observes the strategies and average payo¤s of a subset of all agents, called the information set of an agent. In the following period, agents imitate the strategy with the highest average payo¤ in their information set. To formalize these sets we locate the agents on a circle as in Ellison (1993) . In most parts of the paper, we focus on two information settings: "local" information and "global" information. With local information agents observe the strategies and payo¤s of their immediate neighbors on the circle only. If agents have global information, they observe the strategies and payo¤s of all agents.
3
In order to get a benchmark we …rst analyze the model when all agents are identical and so all contests are symmetric. We show that in this case the information setting has no in ‡uence for the set of absorbing states and the location of the innovator of the cheating strategy is irrelevant. With heterogenous agents there are three crucial factors that determine the spread of the cheating strategy: the location and the type of the innovator of the cheating strategy, the distribution of types on the circle, and the information available to the agents. Since many di¤erent distributions of types on the circle are feasible we focus on two polar cases: maximal segregation and minimal segregation. In a maximally segregated population high types and low types are allocated in two clusters so that there are only two players of each type that have a neighbor of the opposite type. In a minimally segregated population each agent has two neighbors of opposite type.
The following results emerge from the model with heterogenous agents and local information. First, the population is more likely to end up in an absorbing state where all agents cheat if the innovator is a low type. Second, if the innovator is a low type, then a minimally segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a maximally segregated population. Third, in contrast, if the innovator is a high type, a maximally segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a minimally segregated population.
Our paper is most closely related to Ellison (1993) , Eshel et al. (1998) ,
and Kandori et al. (1993) . Kandori et al. (1993) consider the limiting distribution when individual mutation rates go to zero for the class of 2 2 stage games. The players'period payo¤s are the expected values of the stage game given the (distribution of) strategy choices of all players. Like Kandori et al. (1993) we assume "global interaction." Ellison (1993) investigates the limiting distributions and the speed of convergence in a similar model as Kandori et al. (1993) . The crucial di¤erence is that players interact and obtain information locally. Also, Ellison (1993) focuses on coordination games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model with homogenous agents. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the model with heterogenous agents and global and local information, respectively. In Section 5, we allow for mutations. Section 6 concludes.
Symmetric contests
To derive a benchmark, we assume that in this section agents are homogeneous and so all contests are symmetric. We …rst describe the stage game, specify how agents are located and how they adopt or choose new strategies. We then analyze the absorbing strategy states of a dynamic adjustment process of imitation by N individuals who are distributed along a circle.
The Stage Game
We consider a …nite population with N > 1 agents denoted by i = 1; :::; N who live forever. In every period t, the agents are matched to all other agents to play a 2 2 stage game. In each stage game, the agents compete for a prize of value w. The strategy space is fC; Dg, where C stands for playing "clean" respectively fair and D for cheating respectively playing "doped." Within a period, a player cannot change his or her pure strategy. Furthermore, mixed strategies are ruled out.
The payo¤s of the stage game are as follows. If both agents play the strategy C, each gets 
The stage game de…ned in (1) is a Prisoner's Dilemma. If c 7 w 2 , D, respectively C, is the dominant strategy.
Agent i's period payo¤ in period t, u i;t , is the average payo¤ from the N 1 matches, i.e.
where i;t is his strategy in period t, i;t are the strategies chosen by all other players in period t, and the payo¤s a(:; :) are the corresponding elements of A in (1).
Location and Imitation
In order to model incomplete information, we assume that agents are located on a circle on the positions 1; 2; 3; :::; N . In each period, each agent i obtains information about the period payo¤s and the strategies chosen by the agents i k (modulo N ) with k 2 f1; :::; b . Dropping the arguments in u i;t ( i;t ; i;t ), we de…ne agent i's information set
c, the information set contains information about all agents on the circle. In this case, we say that agents have global information. If k < b N 2 c the information set contains not all relevant information. If k = 1, agents observe strategies and payo¤s of their direct neighbors only. We call this information setting local information.
We now turn to the question how agents use their information. Following Eshel et al. (1998) , we assume that at the end of every period t, the agents observe G i;t (k). In the following period, they play the strategy that generated the highest average payo¤. 4 If they observe but one strategy within their information set, they play this strategy next period. Let d j;t denote an indicator variable, which takes the value 0 if agent j plays C and the value 1 if he plays D. Then, if strategies C and D are observed in G i;t (k), the observed payo¤ di¤erence i;t is
The …rst term is the average payo¤ of those agents in the information set that play D and the second term is the average payo¤ of those agents that play C. The imitation dynamics satis…es the following rule.
4 Agents who choose strategies according to an imitation rule can interpret the information they receive in two di¤erent ways. They can either imitate the most successful player or the most successful strategy they observe. The former imitation rule is used by Vega-Redondo (1997) and Alos-Ferrer et al. (2000) and others, the latter e.g. by Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) . We will adhere to an imitation rule of the second kind, where success of a strategy is measured by its average payo¤.
De…nition 1 The imitation rule is
if both strategies C and D are observed in G i;t (k). Otherwise, the agent continues to use the same strategy. The initial strategy state is k;1 = D and k;1 = C for a single k.
The imitation rule implies that if i;t = 0, then i;t+1 = i;t , and for i;t 7 0, we have i;t+1 = C, respectively D. If a strategy is not observed in an agent's information set, then the agent continues to use the strategy of the current period. Note that an agent's behavior depends solely on the strategies observed in his neighborhood in the immediate past. That is, neither the shadow of the future nor the shadow of the more distant past bear any weight for the choice of strategy (Berninghaus et al. 2003) . Finally, throughout the paper we assume that in the initial period t = 1 one agent plays k;0 = D, while all other players play k;0 = C.
We consider an imitation rule and not the best response dynamic because imitation requires less information; players only need to know the strategies played and the realized payo¤s of the players in their information sets. This is particularly relevant for the analysis of cheating since there is no public information available about the strategies and payo¤s of all agents in the game. In contrast a best response dynamic requires that the players know all strategies played in the population. Although our imitation rule seems to be mechanical, it is appropriate in a situation of cheating where everybody tries to hide their information.
In the following we will suppress the time index t. We denote by y the number of agents playing C. This allows us to write agent i's payo¤ of playing
The …rst term in (3) is the period payo¤ of an agent who plays C (d i = 0).
The second term, which depends only on the population size N and the cost c, is the additional payo¤ for an agent of playing D (d i = 1). For homogeneous agents, (3) implies that an agent i who observes C and D in G i (k) compares u j (1; y) and u h (0; y) for some j; h.
Note that i is independent of y. This increases the bene…t of using strategy D relative to C.
Absorbing States
A state is a speci…cation of which agents play C and which play D. At time t, we describe the state s t of the system by an N -tuple s t = ( 1t ; 2t ; :::; N t ) 2 S fC; Dg N ;
where S is the set of possible states. If i and j are two possible strategy states in S, p ij is the probability that the imitation rule changes the system to state j given that i is the current state. The imitation rule in (2) and the 5 Note the di¤erence to best response where each player compares its utility for C and D given the actions of the other players. Suppose y denotes the number of Cs from the rest of the population, excluding i's current action. Then i's payo¤ is
However, under local information agents will not be able to calculate this because y is not known. In contrast, the imitation rule is applicable because agents compare the payo¤s of their neighbors to their own and choose the strategy according to this.
non-stochastic nature of the payo¤s result in a deterministic process such that p ij is either 0 or 1. The collection fp ij g i;j2S , together with an initial state, is a Markov process on S. We will refer to this Markov process as the imitation dynamics of our model.
We are interested in the absorbing states of the imitation dynamics, which are de…ned as in Eshel et al. (1998) .
De…nition 2 A set of states is absorbing if it is a minimal set of states with the property that the Markov process can lead into this set but not out of it.
An absorbing set of states may contain only one state. If an absorbing set contains more than one state, the Markov process cycles between the states contained in the absorbing set.
From now on, we normalize w = 1 (and consequently c is now assumed to be 2 (0; 1)). Moreover, we concentrate on the polar cases; either the size of the information set is k = 1 or k = b 
The Role of Information
Throughout the paper, we study the spread of D in a population in which in t = 1 all agents but one play C.
Global Information
we obtain the following result. , the absorbing stateD, respectivelyC, is reached in period 2.
The proof is straightforward. If all agents observe the strategies and payo¤s of all other agents, i is the same for all i = 1; 2; :::; N . Consequently, when an agent introduces D in period 1, depending on whether i is positive or negative, all agents will play C or D from period 2 on until the end of time. This result has been shown to hold by Kandori et al. (1993) in a more general setting.
Local information
We now consider the case where the agents observe their immediate neighbors
Proposition 2 , i is negative. Consequently, D dies out immediately.
Comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2, we see that the size of the information set only a¤ects the time elapsing until the absorbing state is reached. In particular, it does not matter which player introduces strategy D because all agents have the same chances to win for a given strategy. In the following section we therefore introduce asymmetric contests to see how this in ‡uences the imitation dynamics.
Asymmetric Contests with Global Information
In this section we investigate asymmetric contests, that is, contests in which agents face di¤erent probabilities to win the prize when playing the same strategy as in sports where agents with di¤erent talents compete. We …rst consider the situations in which agents are globally informed.
In Section 4
we then analyze local information.
Asymmetric Stage Games
So far we have assumed that if two agents play the same strategy they have equal probability to win the contest. We now explore the consequences, if this symmetry assumption is relaxed. In particular we assume -as in sports -that players are of di¤erent talents and hence have di¤erent winning probabilities.
In order to model this, we assume that agents are heterogenous, i.e., are If two agents of the same type meet, the stage game is a prisoner's dilemma where strategy D is the dominant strategy if c < 1=2 as in the symmetric contests. In contrast, if two agents of opposite type meet the game is asymmetric and has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. 6 We denote by y H the number of H-types playing C, and by y L the number of L-types playing C. The numbers of H-types and L-types are denoted by n H and n L , respectively, with n H + n L = N . The period payo¤s of H-types and L-types are
Note that the second term in (4) 
The Role of Information
The imitation rule (2) 
, the absorbing stateDD (CC) is reached in period 2.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix.
According to Proposition 3 when information is global, then it is immaterial which type of player innovates D. Intuitively, with global information all agents have the same information. Consequently, all agents follow the same decision rule.
From Propositions 2 and 3 we see that heterogeneity does not a¤ect the absorbing states, if agents have information about strategies and payo¤s of all agents. In the following we will see that heterogeneity matters if agents are locally informed about strategies and payo¤s. 
Note that the players at both ends (H E on position 1 and L EE on position N on the circle) are immediate neighbors. Let us now determine the strategy choices for the three locations by calculating the decision terms introduced above.
Interior Player An interior player has only information about agents of his own type. Consequently, an interior player only observes di¤erences in payo¤s if di¤erent strategies have been played. We write these payo¤ di¤erences as
If
Edge Player Let us …rst consider an edge player of type H. Such a player has an L-type and an H-type as neighbors, i.e. either LH E H or HH E L.
We concentrate on LH E H because HH E L is analyzed in the same way. An H E -player faces eight (= 2 3 ) possible strategy strings in G i;t (1). Two strings are CCC and DDD. In this case the agent does not change his strategy.
The other six strings are
Consider, for example, the …rst term in (8). It means that "L plays C, H E plays D and H plays D." The strategy strings CCD and CDC do not di¤er with respect to the observed average payo¤s. In either case, the L-type and one H-type play C, while the other H-type plays D. Similarly, the strategy strings DDC and DCD yield also the same average payo¤s for D and C, respectively.
We can summarize the decisions of H E by considering the observed differences q H E , where the superscript q refers to the rank of the term in (8). In the Appendix we show that the following ranking holds:
Thus, if for a clean edge player in a DCC string 4 H E > 0, all edge players and all interior players will play D in the following period.
An edge player of type L has an H-type and an L-type in his information group. We analyze HL E L because LL E H is analyzed in the same way. The possible strategy strings in the information group of L E are given in (8). We show in the Appendix that
Next we show that some agents systematically over-or underestimate the true bene…t of the cheating strategy D. Recall that an interior player only observes agents of his own type. Consequently, his decision term L I or H I re ‡ects the true payo¤ di¤erence of the two strategies for his type, i.e. an interior player's assessment of a strategy is not distorted by heterogeneity.
In contrast, according to (9) and (10), edge players systematically over-or underestimate the payo¤s of C or D to their type as de…ned below. H I . The reason for this is that an L-type player's payo¤ using C is always zero except when matched to another L-type player using C in which case his payo¤ is 1=2. In contrast, an H-type who plays C receives a positive payo¤ when matched to another H -type or to an L-type using C. Consequently, an edge player of type H underestimates the bene…t of strategy C, respectively overestimates D, when his L-type neighbor plays C.
There are two crucial features of local information. First, certain agents (edge players and double-edge players) under-or overestimate strategy D, respectively, C. Second, local information permits some agents (interior players) to observe the true payo¤ di¤erence of the two strategies for his type as explained above. In contrast, with global information and heterogenous players no agent ever observes the true payo¤ di¤erence for his type. Thus, the relevant strategy strings are
In the Appendix we show that the following ranking holds,
Like edge players, double-edge players over-or underestimate the payo¤ of strategy D to their type.
Maximal Segregation
Recall that we want to study how the strategy D evolves in a population in which initially all players but one play C. The agent who …rst plays D is called the innovator. Two factors determine the spread of D: The allocation of types along the circle and the location and type of the innovator.
We now consider a distribution of types that we call maximal segregation.
In such a population H-types and L-types are allocated in two clusters as follows:
HHH:::HHLLL:::LLL
In a maximally segregated population, there are only two edge players for each type and no double-edge players. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the number of H-types and L-types is the same, i.
Innovation and absorbing states
As explained above, for each type there are three classes of agents; interior, edge and double-edge players. Within the same class agents may choose different strategies because they have di¤erent information sets. Consequently, we have to distinguish the location of the innovator. Innovation by an interior player has a di¤erent implication for the imitation dynamics than an innovation from an edge player. Moreover, we have also to distinguish among interior players. An innovation through an interior player who is located within other interior players has di¤erent consequences than an innovation from an interior player who is located next to an edge player. We call these special interior players next-to-edge players and give them the superscript N E, while we still denote all other interior players by superscript I. , the process ends up at the absorbing stateDD, respectivelyCC.
(ii) If he is a next-to-edge player, then for c < 
atCC.
Interestingly, the location of the innovator is irrelevant if the innovator is
an L-type. In contrast, if the innovator is an H-type, the location matters.
Finally, the number of agents playing C can decrease in c when the innovation occurs through an H N E -or an H E -type.
Proposition 5 is illustrated for n = 8 in Figure 1 . It displays the role of the type and the location of the innovator. First, if the cost c is drawn at random, then the population is more likely to end up in the absorbing statẽ DD when the innovator is an L-type than when he is an H-type. Second, among the H-types the location of the innovator is crucial. If the innovation arises from an H N E -or an H E -type, then againDD is more likely than if the innovation arises from an H I -type. In this sense, innovations by edge or next-to-edge H-types have similar consequences for the imitation dynamics as those by L-types. Third, the number of agents playing C is non-monotonic in c.
An interesting case is the limiting case when there is no …nite population e¤ect (n ! 1), depicted in Figure 2 . In this case the absorbing stateDC 
Minimal Segregation of Types
After having characterized the absorbing states when the population is maximally segregated, we now consider the polar case of a minimally segregated population. This means that we look at a population in which types are located as follows:
HLHLHLHL:::HLHLHLHL:
Evidently, a minimally segregated population consists of double-edge players only. Consequently, there are only two di¤erent positions where the strategy D can be introduced, H EE and L EE . Again, we assume n H = n L = n. 
Absorbing States
Recall that in a maximally segregated population, all agents of the same type play the same strategy in the absorbing state (with the only exception of edge-players of type L in some absorbing states). In contrast, in a minimally segregated population, not all agents of the same type will end up playing the same strategy. This requires some additional notation.
We denote byC y HC y L a strategy state where the number of H-types and L-types playing C is y H and y L , respectively. In such a state, all agents of either type who play the same strategy are next to each other. Let us de…ne y as the greatest nonnegative odd (even) integer smaller than
if n is even (odd). Note that if 2c (N 1) n 1 2 < 0, i.e. c < , we have y = 0. In this case, the absorbing state isC 0C0 where all agents play D. It is again possible that an absorbing set is attained in which two L-types cycle between D and C. We denote such an absorbing set byC y HC y L . , the absorbing state isC 0C0 , for , the absorbing state isC 0C0 , for it isC yC y 1 , and for c > . In this case, the absorbing state isC n 1Cn if the innovator is an H-type. Second, if the innovator infects its neighbors so that strategy D begins to spread, the spread can be only blocked by H-types. Consequently, in any absorbing state where both strategies survive and where more than one player adopts strategy D there will be always one L player more using D than H-players, i.e. the absorbing state is of typeC yC y 1 . Third, the absorbing stateC n 1Cn is special because the innovator is a H type, which is not able to infect his L-type neighbors. Nevertheless, he continues to use D because strategy D yields a higher payo¤ in his information set. Consequently, the initial strategy string is stationary.
We illustrate Proposition 5 for n = 8 in Figure 3 .
Finally, we also consider the limiting case without …nite population e¤ect (n ! 1). With n going to in…nity, the number y goes to in…nity, too. So we cannot indicate the respective absorbing state with y. We use the share of agents playing C in dependence of the costs c instead. Consequently, an absorbing stateC 4c 1C4c 1 means that for c = 0:3 one …fth (= 4 0:3 1) of the H-types and one …fth of the L-types play C.
From Figure 4 we can see that without …nite population e¤ect the type of innovator is irrelevant. If c < 1=4, then all players will end up using D. 
Maximal versus Minimal Segregation
We conclude this section with a comparison of the absorbing states of a maximally and of a minimally segregated population. For this comparison we calculate the expected share of agents playing C in the absorbing state when each agent is equally likely to innovate D. We focus on large populations (n ! 1) such that …nite population e¤ects can be neglected. Another consequence of this assumption is that the role of edge players (of which there are but two of each type in the maximally segregated population and none in the minimally segregated population) becomes negligible. , all agents play C in the absorbing state for both distributions of types.
These results follow from Propositions 5 and 6. They are depicted in ) the minimally segregated population exhibits a higher share of agents playing C in the absorbing state than the maximally segregated population. The reason for this is that being located between L-types, the H-types are able to block the spread of strategy D. However, for su¢ ciently low cheating costs, i.e. for c 2 (
); the maximally segregated population exhibits a higher share of agents playing C. The reason is that in a maximally segregated population L-types never observe D if the innovator is a H-type.
In contrast, in a minimally segregated population, if D is introduced by a H-type, two L-type will observe it. And since L-types are more likely to be infected than H-types the population share of agents playing D is larger with minimal segregation.
Mutations
In this section we introduce mutations. In each period, after imitations have occurred, each agent's strategy changes with a small probability ". 8 As mentioned before, the imitation dynamics is a Markov chain evolving over the strategy space S. A probability distribution over S in time t is represented as a row vector which is an element of the 2 N -dimensional simplex. The simplex N is the set The process evolves according to t+1 = t P , where P is the transition probability matrix de…ned in Section 2.3. Now that agents'strategies change with probability " after imitation, the transition probability p ij is positive for all i and j, i.e. the Markov chain is regular. Thus, there exists a unique probability distribution 2 N such that
The vector is the unique stationary distribution of the regular Markov process, which does not depend on the initial probability distribution. The stationary distribution is stable, i.e.
>From the law of large numbers for regular Markov chains we have
as T tends to in…nity. 10 Therefore, the probabilities in the limiting distribution can be interpreted as average share of time the process spends in a given state. The transition matrix P (") and the stationary distribution (") depend on ". The stationary and stable probability distribution (") describes the long-run behavior of the imitation dynamics with mutations. Since we are interested in the imitation dynamics for small "; we consider the limiting distribution :
= lim
The limiting distribution , if it exists, depends on the parameter values fc; ng of our model. Even for very small populations, evaluating involves solving a large equation system of 2 2n variables. Instead of …nding (") explicitly and taking the limit for " ! 0, we approximate numerically.
We will describe for a maximally segregated population and the smallest population size (n = 5) that provides all relevant positions of innovation (i.e. in the model without mutations disappears. Nevertheless, we still observe non-monotonicity becauseDD is an element of the absorbing set M and is played with strictly positive probability.
Again, an interesting case is the limiting case when n ! 1, depicted in , the absorbing stateDC is reached with probability 1 in the model with mutations. In the deterministic model, on the other hand, the absorbing state isCC if the innovator is an H I -type andDD otherwise. From this we conclude that our results in the deterministic model are not robust with respect to mutations. This is not so surprising, since due to the imitation rule, agents can only imitate strategies they observe in their information set. Thus, in the absorbing statesCC and DD, the population is locked in. This cannot occur with mutations. For , the model without mutations exhibits another lock-in, which arises if the innovation occurs through an H I -or an H N E -type. For c >
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined an evolutionary game where agents can either play fair or cheat. Our goal was to identify the determinants that eventually lead a situation where all agents cheat. One application we had in mind was doping in sports. There are two characteristics that determine the spread of performance enhancing drugs in sports. First, it is di¢ cult to obtain information about their use since they are illegal. Second, in equilibrium doping a¤ects the winning probabilities of the athletes di¤erently. For this reason we have considered an evolutionary game with local information and asymmetric contests.
We have studied the imitation dynamics when initially all agents play fair and one agent invents the cheating strategy and we have focused on two distributions of types: maximal (equal types are located next to each other) and minimal (agents have always neighbors of opposite type) segregation.
The following results emerge from the model. First, the population is more likely to end up in an absorbing state where all agents cheat if the innovator is a low type. Second, if the innovator is a low type, then a minimally segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a maximally segregated population. Third, in contrast, if the innovator is a high type, a maximally segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a minimally segregated population.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 3
If the innovating agent is an H-type, the initial numbers of clean agents are
If the innovator is an L-type, these numbers are
We …rst notice that due to global information we have that
We therefore drop the type group index of the decision terms.
If the innovation arises from an H-type, the decision term for all agents
From (4) and (5) we get
c and
Using this information we get
If the innovation arises from an L-type agent, the di¤erence in the average payo¤s is
Consequently, the origin of the innovation does not matter if information is global.
Decision Terms for Edge Players
The decision terms for an edge player of type H are
3
For an edge player of type L we get
Decision Terms for Double-Edge Players
For a double-edge player of type H the decision terms are
and for a double-edge player of type L they are
Proof of Proposition 4
We accomplish the proof of Proposition 4 in two parts. We …rst consider the absorbing states when an L-type introduces D.
L-type introduces D.
In the following we assume that the innovator is an interior player L I . The absorbing states are the same when an L N E or an L E innovates D. in the absorbing state all L I play D, and the two L E and all H-types play C. , then H I (n 1; n) > 0, and the H I that observe D will play it in the second period. In the following periods, more and more H I will switch to D since H I is unchanged as long as only H-types observe D. At some point an H E will observe D. His decision term is 2 H E , which from (9), is always higher than H I (n 1; n). So he will adopt. The next player to 11 Note that y L can only become 1 and not 0 if n is even. Start counting outward from an L I inventing D. Since n is even, it takes an uneven number of periods from the period the the …rst L E observes D until the second L E observes D. As explained in the text, the L E cycle between C and D for the interval under consideration. Hence the two L E do not play the same strategies in any given period. This shifts the lower bound of the respective interval to c 2 < c < 1, the strategy D becomes extinct and the absorbing state isCC, because all decision terms are negative.
Proof of Proposition 5
We …rst assume that an H-type plays D in period t = 1. We focus on c < L EE choose between D and C. We call this state L-dominated because more L-types than H-types play D (to be precise: y L y H = 1).
Picture period t = 3 to get the intuition. In t = 3, three agents play D, these are located as follows: We conclude that the absorbing state is reached when 2 H EE is negative ( 2 H EE depends positively on y H ). So only an L-dominated state can be an absorbing state. The interpretation is that it will always be an H-type that stops the spread of D. An H-type will at one point halt the spread of D and act as a blocker to the L-types playing C who would adopt D if they would observe D. The higher c is, the earlier the spread of D is halted, that means, the less agents use D in the absorbing state. We conclude that there exist many di¤erent absorbing states, depending on population size N and the costs c.
We calculate the number of agents playing C in the absorbing state. Since the absorbing state is L-dominated, we can substitute y L with y H 1. The solution y H to this inequality must be an odd (even) number if n is even (odd). This comes from the fact that whenever H EE have the decision term 2 H EE , there is an odd number of H-types playing D. This is because y H decreases by steps of two.
If an L-type agent innovates D in the …rst period, the same arguments apply.
